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Abstract 
Demographic change across the globe puts pressure on labour markets and public finances. Most 
studies on ageing focus on the projected development of the old age dependency ratio, being the 
ratio of persons 65 or older relative to the working age population. This ratio gives a very 
incomplete picture of the (fiscal) pressure from demographic changes. In this study, besides the 
share of the dependent population composed of the young and the old, we also include the share 
of the working age population that is not active on the labour market, labelled as the labour 
market space. By analysing 21 developing and 29 developed economies across the globe, we 
cover 75% of the 9.3 billion people that the United Nations projects for the whole world in 2050. 
A new indicator, relating demographic pressure from fiscal spending to the available space at the 
labour market, enables us to quantify and compare the pressure-to-space across countries over 
the time span 2010-2050. The indicator points out that Poland, Turkey and Greece are most 
under pressure. Developing countries, such as Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Tanzania will experience a very low pressure up to 2050 in case their fiscal spending per young 
and elderly person remains at the current levels. In most of the countries under high pressure 
there seems to be room for using the labour market space by, for instance, working more hours 
or increasing the retirement age, as this will alleviate the fiscal pressure. This suggests a policy 
trade-off between maintaining publicly financed services to the dependent population and 
maintaining labour market space. 
Keywords: demography, dependency rates, labour market, unemployment, social security, 
pensions, government spending. 
JEL codes: D6, E24, E62, H51, H52, H53, H55, J0, J11, J18, J21, J26, O57. 
                                                                
1 Correspondence addresses: L.F.M.Groot@uu.nl and huber@TinaMargaPeeters.eu. All your comments are 
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“Prediction is difficult - especially of the future”, ascribed to Mark Twain. 
 
“… each generation cares twice and is taken care of twice…” – Bovenberg,, 2008 
 
Après moi, le déluge / Nach mir die Sintflut/ Wie dan leeft, wie dan zorgt  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After the emergence of the financial crisis, there is increasing concern for the solvency of states. 
As the policy discussion in the US and the Euro area makes clear, sovereign risk is not only 
dependent on the current and accumulated government debt as a percentage of GDP. Equally 
important are the prospects for the future, especially the increasing fiscal burdens of social 
security and health care for the old aged in ageing societies. Technically, fiscal policy is 
sustainable as long as there is equalisation of the net present value of primary surpluses and 
debt obligations (Ley, 2010:6). Analogously, a country is solvent as long as the net present value 
of its primary surpluses are greater or equal than the net present value of its debt obligations. 
On the assets side productivity (growth), the size of the workforce and the labour force 
participation rate largely determine the future stream of tax revenues. On the liability side, the 
share of the young and old aged in the population determine largely the accumulated 
government debt and the future stream of government commitments with respect to main 
categories of public spending such as health care, social security and education. Indeed, 
population ageing in developed countries, due to a declining fertility rate and a steadily increase 
in life expectancy worldwide, poses a challenge to the fiscal sustainability of conventional 
welfare programs such as public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems, comprehensive and 
universal health care coverage, child benefits and free education. In general, ageing increases the 
financial burden of the active working age population and threatens the intergenerational 
contract, which Bovenberg (2008:601) describes as one where … each generation invests in the 
human capital of the next and is taken care of at the end of its life by the generations in which it has 
invested. Hence, each generation cares twice (once for the previous and once for the next 
generation) and is taken care of twice (as a child and in old age). This statement duly illustrates 
that the active working age population has to bear the burden, mainly by paying for the 
education of the younger generation and providing health care and pensions to the elderly.  
We will show that the situation in the developing economies in the decades to come is not only 
characterised by a steadily growing inactive share composed of young and old people, and thus a 
declining share of the working age population, but also by a rising population share of the old 
aged and a falling share of the young. As the former is more costly in terms of public pensions 
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and health care, while the latter is the future labour potential, it implies a gradually upward 
pressure on per capita fiscal costs imposed on those of working age. Countries where 
demographic changes worsen the fiscal position have a set of optional measures to cope with the 
challenges. For instance, countries can raise the official retirement age, abolish early retirement 
schemes, index retirement pensions at inflation instead of at wage growth, allow more 
immigration, gradually reform the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system into a capital funded pension 
system or increase the public debt when ageing hits.  
The demographic dynamics in developing countries delivers a slightly rosier picture. For 
decades to come, the share of the working age population will be high and increasing. Moreover, 
whereas in most OECD countries health care and public pension provisions are both 
comprehensive and universal, only a small minority of the old age in developing countries is 
entitled to social security and coverage against health care costs (see Bloom and McKinnon 
2010:15). Ceteris paribus, both factors imply a lower fiscal burden for the future, which might 
offer a potentially high “growth dividend” for these nations. 
The problem of ageing in the developed countries is commonly summarised in terms of a rising 
old age dependency ratio (OADR), which expresses that in the future there will be more 
pensioners for every person of working age. In principle, one can apply the same reasoning to 
the young. Rising young age dependency ratios (YADR) that we observe for developing countries 
by definition implies more youngsters for every person of working age. However, this is not the 
full story. The same economies that will experience steeply rising dependency ratios in the 
future are characterised by high inactive shares of the working age population, mainly because 
many of working age population (e.g. housewives, unemployed) do not perform paid work or 
only part-time because of the existence of easy accessible and generous welfare benefits, such as 
early retirement and disability schemes. In principle at least, reducing the inactivity among 
those of working age can relieve part of the fiscal pressure of ageing. So, what is usually left out 
is that countries may differ not only in the development of the OADR or YADR, but also in the 
share of the working age population that is actually involved in paid work. 
In this paper, we focus on what we call the labour market space as a potential source to cushion 
the effects of pressing demographic developments. We define labour market space as that part of 
the working age population that is not doing (full-time) paid work. The labour force 
participation rate measured in full-time equivalents and henceforth its complement – labour 
market space – is a country-specific system variable in our analyses. A vast number of factors 
determine whether a country has a high or labour market space. Among them, there is the 
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generosity and accessibility of the social benefits, labour market rigidities (trade unions, 
minimum wages, employment protection), habits and norms with respect to female labour 
participation, active labour market policies, (absence of) early retirement schemes, working 
hours and holidays legislation, tax-induced financial incentives to paid work. In most Anglo-
Saxon countries, with a mean and lean welfare state, flexible labour markets and a strong 
financial incentive to do paid work, the labour force participation rate is high and thus labour 
market space is low. Low labour force participation rates and thus a high labour market space 
characterises other countries, mainly in continental Europe.  
The idea behind our analyses is that using the labour market space can at least partly 
accommodate the (fiscal) pressure from changing demographic structures, which means for 
most countries around the globe the pressure from an ageing population. For instance, raising 
the statutory retirement age, cutting early retirement benefits or introducing more active labour 
market policies may raise the labour force participation rate and thus lower the ratio of inactive 
and active persons among the working age.  
We analyse 50 economies across the globe, 21 developing and 29 developed, that cover 75% of 
the global population in 2050. The data come from various official sources (OECD, UN, World 
Bank) we show demographic changes for a large heterogeneous set of both developed and 
developing countries from 1950 to 2050, pitched against the labour market space. In doing so, 
we make two heuristic assumptions. First, for each country we fix the ratio of public old age 
expenditures per old person and GDP per capita to its 2008 level. Therefore, if in some country 
the public expenditures on pensions and health care per old aged are a certain fraction of GDP 
per capita in the base year 2008, we maintain this fraction in the projections up to 2050 due to 
the lack of better information. The same goes for public expenditures on the young, consisting 
mainly of family support (child benefits) and costs of education. This implies that we freeze the 
publicly organized generosity of countries with respect to the dependent young and old aged. In 
this way, we can exclude from the analysis the future growth in (labour) productivity, since GDP 
per capita is the basis for all monetary variables that we use. Second, since labour market space 
and the participation rate are system variables that will only change substantially by major 
changes in the system we take the labour market space as a fraction of the working age 
population as a country characteristic over time. In an empirical section, we will provide some 
support for this assumption for the period 1970-2010. Our historical track data show that the 
variation between countries is the lion share of the total variation in labour market space across 
countries and over time, while the variation within countries over time is low.  
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Although we assume space fixed relative to the working age population in the course of future 
decades, as a fraction of total population it may change due to changes in the population age 
structure. Ageing countries most likely will respond by taking policy measures to cope with the 
fiscal challenge of ageing. As demographic pressure is pitched against labour market space in 
our analyses, we are able to show to what extent countries are facing demographic pressures 
(measured by the projected old age and young age dependency ratios and the associated fiscal 
burdens), and the room to cope with these pressures (measured by the projected labour market 
space). For example, a country with a high labour market space but a high and increasing 
demographic pressure can easily accommodate, at least in principle, the additional fiscal 
spending by taking policy measures that raise labour market participation. In sharp contrast, a 
country with a similar demographic pressure but a low labour market space is in a dire state, 
because there is little room to increase labour market participation even further. Of course, a 
host of other factors determines whether a country is able to cope with its demographic 
dynamics. Here we concentrate on demographics and macro labour market characteristics and 
postpone for further research the role of finance and migration. We also make suggestions for 
further research. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides our motivation for studying the 
demographic pressures in relation to the labour market space and discusses the conceptual 
issues. Section 3 defines labour market space and demographic pressure and introduces the 
pressure-to-space indicator that we use later on to rank countries. Section 4 illustrates and 
describes the labour market space and dependencies for a representative sample of countries 
across the globe. In the sensitivity analysis of section 5, we present sensitivity analyses for the 
developing economies, as our statistical information is more uncertain for this group. Section 6 
presents our reflections on the major policy issues that emerge from the empirical analyses. 
Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
As we put a great effort in constructing the database, we present it in much more detail in the 
appendices. Appendix A describes the data sources that we used. Appendix B illustrates the 
demographic structures, the pyramids, kites and chess pawns, for each of the 50 economies that 
we analyse for the years 2010 and 2050. It also illustrates the coverage of the countries in our 
analyses per continent. Appendix C lays down in formulas in which way we derived the most 
important statistics that we show in graphs and tables in this study. Appendix D gives some 
additional per country statistics for the full sample period 2010-2050.  
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2. MOTIVATION AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
Before the G20-meeting in 2006 (see G20, 2006), there was not much attention for the global 
picture of projected demographic changes from an international policy point of view. Although 
there is ample research on the (fiscal) problem of ageing in developed economies, there is only 
scant attention to the position of developing economies (see Mason et al. 2006 and Lee et al. 
2006 for ageing in Asia). One reason for disregarding developing countries is that these 
economies still have high fertility rates and a relatively short longevity and that public support 
for the old and young is still modest. Another reason might be more practical, being the lack of 
reliable data on the composition of public expenditures. The lack of attention for the 
international (comparative) perspective may be due to the belief that policy measures to cope 
with demographic challenges are taken at the national discretion, with little or no room for 
international coordination. 
However, economists point more and more at the potential spillovers of demographic changes. 
More migration may occur, as immigration at tight domestic labour markets alleviates the 
pressure in filling job vacancies. For some countries, international financial flows could dry up in 
case national governments will not be able to maintain fiscal sustainability (see G20, 2006). In 
some developed economies, shrinking populations and henceforth-shrinking labour market 
forces will negatively influence domestic economic growth. It might affect global growth too. 
There are many perspectives to study demography and ageing, e.g. Brooks (2000) focuses on the 
impact of demographic developments on financial markets, Bloom et al. (2004) on public 
finances and Horioka (2010) on savings. 
This paper links the demographic effects on public finance as well as labour market 
characteristics. The value added of this paper is further that we include developed and 
developing economies. Alongside all major developed economies, we also investigate the largest 
developing economies.2 In sum, we have 50 countries (see Appendix B). The projected 
population in 2050 for these 50 countries is 7.0 billion, being 75% of the 9.3 billion projected for 
the whole world. The coverage for 2010 is 79% (5.4 of the 6.9 billion persons worldwide).  
                                                                
2 We include the G-20 consisting of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, 
Italy, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Further to this, we include the OECD 
countries consisting of the 27 EU economies and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries Iceland, 
Norway and Switzerland. In addition, Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Tanzania and Uganda are included as they are in the top 20 of 
the most populated countries in 2050 according to the United Nations. Finally, we include Bulgaria and 
Romania as they fall also in the group of developing economies according to our definition, although being 
part of the European Union. 
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Figure 1  Labour market participation over a person’s life cycle 
 
Source: Authors, see also Andersen (2006). 
As a starting point for the conceptual analysis of demographic pressure and labour market 
space, consider the schematic overview of a representative person of the population over the life 
cycle in Figure 1, categorized into education, (part-time) working and (early) retirement, with 
age on the horizontal axis. The arrow left shows the tendency that rising education levels 
increases the age that people enter the labour market. The arrow above indicates the combined 
effect of a reduction of the working week, the utilisation of (maternity, parental) leaves, part-
time work and others factors that contribute to non-participation at the labour market. The 
arrow at the right pointing to the left illustrates the tendency to retire early. Finally, the arrow at 
the far right points at the rising average longevity. The combined effect of the tendencies to start 
working later, to work fewer hours and to retire earlier while longevity is on the rise implies 
that in a smaller part of total lifetime – the square in the middle representing the active part of 
the working age population – all expenditures of the population have to be earned. Policy 
makers can counteract this pressure by a variety of policy measures aimed to push up the active 
to inactive ratio, such as raising the retirement age and the official number of hours of the full-
time workweek or stimulating part-time workers to work more hours. Due to the absence of the 
relative population shares of the different categories, Figure 1 does not reveal to what extent the 
demographic structure really burdens the active part of the working age population. We 
therefore present Figure 2 that provides schematically a population pyramid with roughly the 
same categories as in Figure 1. 
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Figure 2 Categorised population pyramid 
 
Source: Authors. 
Note: Population is divided into young age (yap), old age (oap) and working age population (wap), where 
the latter is divided into paid workers and the non-participating part of wap (denoted by s). See Appendix 
C for the mathematical expressions. 
 
In Figure 2, age is measured on the vertical axis and the population in number of people on the 
horizontal axes, split into women (left) and men (right). The filled area inside the curved lines 
for both women and men stands for the labour market participation rate measured in full-time 
equivalents (fte) at different ages. In most countries, labour market participation is higher for 
men than for women. We assume that all children up to the age of 15 are still attending school. 
Due to early retirement schemes, the curved lines bend inwards for the cohorts just below 65 
year, which we take as the official retirement age.  
Our main interest in this study is the area of non-workers or labour market space (denoted by s), 
being the part of the working age population (wap) that is not participating at the labour market. 
Examples are students above the age of 15, retirees below the age of 65, the disabled, sick and 
unemployed on welfare and other jobless people (e.g. housewives). As noted previously, in our 
subsequent analyses we assume that the area of s, and thus employment measured in fte as the 
complement of space, remains constant relative to wap whatever population growth or changes 
in population structure. In effect, we fixed the composition of the working age population into 
working and non-working (s), both measured in fte. To see how this works out, compare the 
actual and projected population of India and Japan in 2010 and 2050 per cohort of 5-years in 
Figure 3. For the sake of the argument, let us suppose that in 2010 the active working age 
population is half the total working age population in both countries. 
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Figure 3 Cohort population pyramid in India and kite in Japan in 2010 and 2050 
in number of persons 
 
Source: Authors - based on projections by the United Nations Population Information Network, 2011.  
Note: This is the median variant, see appendix B for the other 48 countries in our analyses. See Appendix B 
for the population structures, varying in shape from normal pyramids for developing to kites and chess 
pawns for developed economies of the other countries that we use in our empirical analyses. 
 
As there is only a small increase in the share of India’s old age population and a much larger 
decrease in the share of the young, the working age population as a share of the total population 
will rise. Due to the fixed ratio of non-working and working people in the working age 
population, the ratio of inactive to active for the whole population will fall. In other words, even 
if we assume the same participation rate among the work force in 2050 as in 2010, India does 
not face a rising demographic problem, as there will be sufficient labour supply. Japan is a 
different story (see right panel). Its kite-shaped population structure in 2010 makes that there is 
a huge increase in the share of the old-aged, only partially compensated by a decline in the share 
of the young. The share of the working age population will decline. Therefore, the Japanese 
inactive-active ratio will rise sharply, unless Japan is able to raise labour force participation.  
 
In the next section, we introduce an index measuring pressure-to-space, to identify which 
countries are most likely to face an increased burden on the working age population because of 
demographic dynamics in the next four decades. As noted before, this analysis is partial in the 
sense that countries may have other instruments at their disposal to deal with demographic 
challenges, among which increasing the government debt or stimulating a migration inflow. One 
can interpret our results therefore also as a first indication which countries are more likely to 
resort to these strategies in the more distant future. 
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3. DEFINING DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURE AND LABOUR MARKET SPACE 
This section defines the various measures of demographic pressure, the labour market space, 
the inactive-active ratio and the indicator pressure-to-space. As illustrated in Figure 2, we split 
the populations of nations into three categories: young people as those that are below 15 years, 
old people as those above the age of 65, and the working age population as those between 15 and 
65 years with the latter split into working and non-working measured in full-time equivalents. 
As is customary in demographic studies, we express the pressure of the old aged as the old age 
dependency ratio, defined as the number of persons 65 or older relative to the working age 
population. As argued in the previous section, this dependency ratio gives a very incomplete 
picture of the actual pressure per (full-time) worker as soon as one takes into account that in 
some countries a significant part of the working age population is not doing paid work at all, or 
only part-time, summarized as the labour market space.  
 
The burden per worker of providing public pensions and health care in an economy with an 
increasing old age dependency ratio is much lower if a large share of the working age are 
actually (full-time) working compared to when only a small share is working. To stress our point 
once more, we take this labour market space as a country-specific system variable that can 
change, but probably only in a significant way if authorities take policy measures that change the 
underlying system, such as flexibilisation of the labour market or abolishing early retirement 
schemes.  
 
We stick to the convention by labelling old age and young age dependency ratios as oadr and 
yadr respectively (see also Appendix C), and express old age, young age and the non-
participating part of the working age population relative to total population as oap, yap and s 
respectively, where the suffix p stands for the share of the total population. The ratio of the 
inactive and active share of the population (denoted ia) in a country i in year t and its change 
from year t to T (holding space fixed) can be expressed as a simple formula with only two 
factors: the population share of the working age population (wap) and the labour market space 
(s). As we derive in Appendix C, it follows that 
      
 
              
  
 (1) 
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Ceteris paribus, the lower the population share of the working age population (wap) or the 
higher the share of the potential workforce not inserted into paid work s, the higher is the ia-
ratio. The lower bound for the ia-ratio is zero, which applies if and only if everyone is of working 
age and working full-time. In contrast, the ia-ratio goes to infinity in case the space s approaches 
one, having the logic interpretation that almost everybody in the economy is inactive as nobody 
is working.  
The ia-ratio can easily attain values higher than two (this is the case for the Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, South Africa and Turkey for 1995-2005, see 
Appendix D), which means that against one person working full-time there are more than two 
persons not working at all. The ia-ratio is already two if half of the population is of working age 
and among them two thirds work full-time (                    . In macro-economic 
terms, every full-time worker then cares for himself and two inactive persons. Obviously, in 
times of demographic change in that the shares of young and old are increasing, the variable 
space is what policy-makers may wish to reduce by means of their labour market policies. We 
come back to these policy issues in section 6. 
Figure 4 shows the development of the population share of the working aged and the ia-ratio 
over the time span 1950-2050. Since we assumed labour market space to remain constant for 
the period 2010-2050, the change in the population share of the working age in each country 
drives entirely the change in the ia-ratio after 2010 (see Equation (1)). As the upper panel of the 
figure shows, there is considerable change in the share of the workforce over time, e.g. for South 
Korea it falls from 0.72 in 2020 to 0.54 in 2050, which will ceteris paribus lead to an increase in 
the ia-ratio. Except for India and Egypt, all countries show an increasing ia-ratio for the next four 
decades. 
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Figure 4a. Development of the population share of the working age population 
 
Figure 4b. Development of the ia-ratios 
 
Source: Authors - based on projections by the United Nations Population Information Network, 2011.  
Note: We keep the labour market space constant for each country during the whole period 2010-2050. 
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3.1 Demographic pressure 
So far, we have only paid attention to the number of persons in different categories. However, 
the real fiscal pressure coming from the young and old is not only determined by the number of 
young or old, relative to (the working part of) the workforce, but also by the average cost per 
person that the government is making relative to GDP per capita. Denoting these costs as    and 
  , it then follows that the fiscal pressure of the young and old relative to GDP are 
          
            
      
 
(2a) 
and 
          
            
      
 
(2b) 
where     represents the young age population and OAP the old age population and     is the 
nominal gross domestic product.  
 
In view of the significant changes in demographic structures,, our interest is also in the change in 
pressure (     ) in year   in comparison with year  , that is  
                            
(3) 
We wish to analyse future developments of the pressure while we lack reliable information on 
the costs per old or young person in the future. For this reason, the cost of a young person 
relative to GDP per capita, denoted by   , and the cost of an old person relative to GDP per 
capita, denoted as   , are constant over time, 3 but country specific, so  
                                                         
(4) 
with yap the young and oap old age, both as a ratio of the total population. In this way, the 
pressure variables reflect the fiscal burdens of (changes in) the age structure of the population.  
How much pressure results is thus both depending on the shares of young and old and on the 
parameters φ and θ which reflects how well the dependent persons are taken care of by public 
                                                                
3 See also Volker and Werding (2010) that adopt the assumptions for the group of OECD countries. 
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services relative to GDP per capita. In case of a rejuvenating nation, that is a country with a 
pyramid age structure with a broad base such as India in 2010 (see the left hand panel of Figure 
3), the relatively high fraction     contributes to the pressure of the young. Analogously, in case 
of an ageing society, being a country with a kite age structure such as Japan in 2050 (the right 
hand panel of Figure 3), the pressure-of-the-old increases due to the increasing share of the old 
aged in the population.  
 
3.2 Labour market space 
To calculate the labour market space, we have to know how many persons of the working age 
population are participating, and how many hours they work. The employment rate (  ) is 
defined as total employment (E) as a percentage of the working age population (   ), that is 
    
 
   
 
(6) 
where for convenience sake we have left out the country and time subscripts. We assume that 
each person between the age of 15 and the official retirement age is part of the working age 
population (potential labour force). Note that the employment rate incorporates the effect of 
early retirement, since ceteris paribus the closer the effective retirement age (      ) is to the 
official retirement age (         ), the higher is the number of employed in the nominator of 
equation (6). 
Under PAYG-systems, it matters to what extent those employed work part- or full-time. 
Therefore, in the definition of labour market space, we weigh the employment rate by the 
average number of working hours of the employed relative to full-time maximum working hours  
        
 
    
 
 (7) 
Accordingly, the labour market space is lower, the higher the employment rate and the more 
close the actual average number of hours worked per year among the employed ( ) to the full-
time maximum number of hours worked per year (    ). We do not count the officially 
unemployed as employed. Consequently, the unemployed persons are part of the labour market 
space. 
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Some remarks are in order. A first point is that the group of people between the ages of 15 and 
65 that is not able to work due to a physical or psychological handicap, is part of the labour 
market space according to our definition. The lack of harmonisation in classification of disabled 
people across countries makes it difficult for us to exclude this group from the space definition. 
A second point is that the definition of the working age population as people between 15 and 65 
may be too narrow for some countries. In many developed and developing economies, people 
above 65 are occasionally still working, and children of 15 or below are often working in 
developing economies. 
 
3.3 Demographic pressure versus labour market space 
Figure 4 pitches labour market space on the vertical axis against demographic pressure on the 
horizontal axis, with four quadrants, each with either a low (high) demographic pressure 
combined with a low (high) degree of labour market space. First, we take a static view and start 
with quadrant IV (southeast). This is the case of a high dependency rate in combination with a 
low degree of labour market space. This is good in so far as the burden of the demographically 
dependent groups, given the size of the working age population, is spread over many workers, 
most of them working close to full-time. It is worrisome to the extent that there is not much 
space to relieve the burden, the more so if demographic pressure will rise further in the future. 
In quadrant I (north-west), the demographic pressure is low and there is ample room to raise 
participation and hence potential production. Quadrants II and III are intermediate cases, 
comparatively better than IV either because pressure is lower (III) or potentially the burden of 
the pressure can be relieved by reducing space (II), but worse than I because pressure is higher 
(II) or space to relieve the burden is limited (III).  
The situation of a country in quadrant II can be as inconvenient as the situation of a country in 
quadrant III. In fact, the ample labour market space available in quadrant II can be used to 
alleviate the burden of high demographic pressure. The absence of much pressure from the 
dependent population is a fortunate circumstance in quadrant III, but the already tight labour 
market leaves little room for cushioning an increasing demographic pressure.  
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Figure 5 Demographic pressure versus labour market space 
 
Source: Authors. 
Note: The scaling on the x-axis is indicative. It can be negative in case of dependency pressure changes. 
This brings us to the dynamic view. Obviously, countries may move from one quadrant to the 
other over time and one of the purposes of this paper is to present those movements. Since we 
assume a constant, although country-specific, labour market space over time, this implies that 
countries can only move horizontally, so we either have movements from I to II or the other way 
around and likewise for III and IV. The purport of the empirical analyses, following in the next 
section, is to see where countries were located in this diagram in the past (1950/1970-2010) 
and where they will move to in the future (2010-2050). For the past, we expect that labour 
market space is both country-specific and roughly constant over time. If so, it vindicates our 
assumption to keep labour market space fixed as well in the future. The year of the measured 
change in the dependency rate always concerns year   in comparison from year  , where    , 
while the degree of the labour market space is always measured in year   even if   is far in the 
future. The longer the time span between now to the future, the more time the labour market 
has to adjust to accommodate the change in pressure. 
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3.4 The indicator pressure-to-space 
In our endeavour to compare the pressure of the dependent population in relation to the 
available labour market space across countries, we define the indicator pressure-to-space as: 
        
                 
    
 
                                                    (8) 
Consider the hypothetical chess pawn shaped population pyramid in Figure 6, which we 
introduce to illustrate both the static and the dynamical view on pressure-to-space. The pressure 
is high and labour market space is low, resulting in a high value for the indicator pressure-to-
space in 2010, but for sure the exceptional bulge of old aged in 2010 will gradually disappear 
and the indicator will gradually decline. It illustrates that the dynamics of the demographic 
structure is important, as a high value for the indicator is less troublesome if one expects it to 
come down. In a similar vain, for the opposite case, a low indicator value is not a reason to 
simply sit and wait if one expects it to increase sharply in the future. As Appendix B illustrates, 
the case is after all not so hypothetical as the demographic structures of Greece and Poland, for 
instance, are expected to show such a chess pawn form, albeit in 2050. 
Reforming the labour market is characterised by piecemeal social engineering and will take 
considerable implementation time. Even after the implementation of reforms, it will take time 
before the general equilibrium effects have become fully effective. Thus, in case of expected 
increasing pressure in the future and ample space at the labour market today, a wise thing to do 
is to take measures today. Therefore, the pressure variables at some future year T will be 
compared with the space variable today in our empirical analyses, where T-t equals one, two, 
three or four decades. 
As the hypothetical example above suggests, in addition to the actual level of pressure-to-space, 
also the change in pressure-to-space is relevant. Some countries face an already high pressure-to-
space and seem to cope with it. However, countries that will face a major change in pressure for 
the years to come may consider increasing the labour market participation to cover the 
additional fiscal costs resulting from the demographic change. 
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Figure 6 Transition of categorised population pyramid 
 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
We therefore also measure the change in the pressure-to-space indicator, as: 
       
               
      
 
                                               (9) 
where   refers to the difference from time t to T.  
As derived in Appendix C, it holds that  
             
  
  
                
  
  
 
(10) 
Consequently, as we assumed that φ and s are country-specific but constant, the pressure-to-
space indicator only depends on (the change in) wap. Accordingly, a rise in the old or young age 
dependency ratios – which is per definition a decline in the population share of the work force - 
leads to an upward push of the indicator pressure-to-space. However, this upward pressure will 
be higher the more generously the dependent population is treated (  is high) and the lower is 
the labour market space. We come back to this feature in our policy reflections in section 6.  
2010 2050 
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4. A GLOBAL COMPARISON OF PRESSURE-TO-SPACE 
This section presents the empirical measures for the key variables of the conceptual analysis and 
the derived indicators. The key variables are the dependency ratios for the young and old, 
relevant for the measurement of demographic pressure, and the population share of the 
workforce in combination with the effective retirement age and average working hours to 
calculate our measure of the labour market space. For a broad range of countries worldwide, we 
calculate the inactive-active ratio and the pressure-to-space indicator for the time span 2010-
2050 according to the formulas presented in the previous section.  
 
4.1 Demographic pressure across the globe 
The dependency ratios in Egypt, Germany, Greece, India, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands and the 
US are illustrated in Figure 7 for the century 1950 - 2050. As the upper panel shows, the old age 
dependency ratios increase across the board and diverge after 2010, ranging from 20% for India 
to 90% for Japan in 2050. This means that in 2050 for each person in India of working age there 
will just be 0.2 person aged 65 or more, against 0.9 person in Japan. The opposite pattern applies 
for the young age dependency ratios, gradually declining and converging to around 30% in 2050. 
Egypt, a developing economy with a very young population, stands out: in 1960, there were 
almost as many Egyptian children below the age of 15 as there were people of working age and 
at the turn of the century against every two persons in working age there was still one child. In 
contrast, Japan’s youth dependency ratio has dropped from 60% in 1950 to 20% in 2010 and is 
expected to stay at this level up to 2050, implying that for each five grown up persons of 
working age there is only one youngster below the age of 15.  
 
An interesting feature emerging from the lower panel combining both dependency ratios is that 
almost all our countries, except Egypt and India, reach the lowest point in the period around 
2010 (see the vertical line that marks the year 2010). Moreover, as the upper panel shows, in 
between 1950-2010 all countries are ageing, although developing nations Egypt and India only 
slightly due to the fall of the young age dependency ratios outweighing the increase of the old 
age dependency ratio. For 2010-2050, it is the other way around. The gradual decline in the 
youth dependency rates is outweighed by the increasing old age dependency ratios, leading to 
rising combined dependency ratios, again except for Egypt and India.  
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Figure 7 Development of dependency ratios 
% of number of people between 15 and 65 years 
 
Source: Authors - based on projections by the United Nations Population Information Network, 2011.  
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Figure 8 Government spending on the young and the old in 2007 
% GDP 
 
Source: OECD, Society at a glance (2011). 
Note: Pensions include old age and survivors’ pensions. 
 
 
If, from the fiscal point of view, young and old are equally costly, so public pensions and health 
care per old aged are roughly equal to educational expenditures and child benefits per young, 
then the lower panel of Figure 7 suggests that the fiscal challenge for the future is not that 
different from that in the past. For example, South Korea will face a steadily rising dependency 
ratio up to 2050, but it is roughly similar, albeit in reverse order, to the dependency ratio in the 
past five decades. 
The burden on the working population does not only depend on the relative shares of the young 
and old aged as pictured in Figure 7, but also on the fiscal costs of family support and 
educational expenditures for the young and public health care and public pension outlays for the 
old. Figure 8 illustrates these for a number of countries in our sample for 2005, where the 
ranking of countries is according to the size of the pension outlays (as a percentage of GDP). As 
with dependency ratios, there is also considerable heterogeneity in spending relative to GDP. 
0
5
10
15
Italy
France
Austria
Greece
Portugal
Germany
Poland
Japan
Hungary
Belgium
Finland
Spain
Czech R
Mexico
pensions
health
education
family
A global view on demographic pressure and labour market participation Page 24 
 
Italy, France, Austria and Germany rank highest with in between 12-15% of GDP spent on 
pensions, while Finland, Spain, Czech Republic and Mexico pay the least in terms of public 
pensions, in between 1 to 5% of GDP. Overall, public health care tends to be the second highest 
spending category, followed by educational spending, which is close to 5% of GDP for most 
countries. Family support, although minor compared to the other categories, shows the highest 
variation across countries.  
Some caveats are in order to interpret Figure 8. Health care does not concern only the old 
people, although probably the lion share of these costs are made on behalf of the old as most 
health care is provided in the last part of people’s life. Since we do not have information on the 
distribution of public health care costs by age categories, we will leave this item out of the 
analysis and only include them in the sensitivity analysis in section 5. To some extent, 
government expenditures on family support and education also need not be confined to the 
young only, but we assume that this is generally the case. Therefore, in our subsequent analysis 
family support and education costs are attributed to the young.  
The expenditure shares in Figure 8 are of course affected by the age composition of the 
populations, e.g. the high GDP share of pensions for Italy is not only due to the relative 
generosity of public pensions, but also to the current high old age dependency ratio and the high 
labour market space. Ideally, one would like to have statistics across countries for pensions, 
health care, education and family support expenditures per old and young aged relative to GDP 
per capita, but to the best of our knowledge these are not available from comparative public 
databases. 
 
4.2 Labour market space across the globe 
Since World War II, the emergence of part-time work and temporary leaves (maternity, 
parental), longer educational careers, the introduction of early retirement schemes and other 
welfare programs for those of working age have contributed to the phenomenon that a 
considerable part of the workforce is not doing paid work, or only part time, which we 
summarize in the statistic labour market space. Opposite these labour market loosening 
tendencies several countries have recently taken measures to stimulate the labour market 
participation, either with a view to their demographic developments or because of favourable 
economic conditions.  
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Figure 9  Labour market space 1970-2008
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of OECD databases, using equation (7). 
Note: Calculations according to formula (7) with the maximum number of hours set at 1820 (52 weeks at 
40 hours per week) and the official retirement age at 65. 
 
 
Long term series of the labour market space show that there are some economies with a 
gradually increasing or gradually decreasing trend (see Figure 9). The labour market space in 
Japan, for instance, has a gradual increasing trend during the period 1970-2009. It had very little 
space in 1970 and moved up to 20% in 2007. Also South Korea shows an upward trend. On the 
other hand, the Netherlands shows a decreasing trend. Most countries, among them the US, 
Germany and Greece included in Figure 9, show a rather stable path over this long period. Even 
more interesting than the development of the labour market space over time is its average level 
by country. The labour market space is consistently very high in Germany and very low in South 
Korea, where the upward jump at the end of the 1990s can be attributed to the Asian crisis, 
which caused unemployment to increase dramatically by more than one million people.  
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We split the total variation in labour market space across countries and over time into between 
country variation on the one hand and within country variation over time on the other ahand. 
The findings whos that the former is four times as large as the latter. This provides empirical 
support for our assumption that labour market space is predominantly a country characteristic, 
rather constant over time. 
 
4.3 Demographic pressure versus labour market space across the globe 
 
The pressure in relation to the space is illustrated in Figure 10, for the young (upper panel), for 
the old and for both combined (lower panel). Figure 11 illustrates the change in total pressure, 
again related to the labour market space. In these analyses we assume that the official 
retirement age is 65 and that the maximum number of working hours equals 2080, implying 52 
weeks at 40 hours. As the base year for the labour market space we take 2008 because 2009 is 
the first recession year after the financial crisis which started in the autumn of 2008 (and 2010 
is not yet available). The pressure is measured here at 2020. Because of lack of information on 
fiscal spending for many of the developing economies, we imposed that fiscal spending to the 
young and old relative to GDP per capita are equal to the lowest level that we have among our 
set of countries, being Mexico. Since Mexico is member of the OECD, its fiscal statistics are 
harmonised with the other OECD countries. In the sensitivity analyses in the next section we 
come back to this asumption.  
 
The results show that by and large the developing economies tend to cluster at the left while the 
developed economies are scattered at the right, both for the young age pressure (Figure 10a) 
and the old age pressure (Figure 10b). Take the case of Egypt. Based on the high share of young 
people one would expect that the pressure of the young would be high, however, for the fiscal 
pressure it is not only the population share that counts, but also the amount of public support to 
the youth relative to GDP per capita. Since the latter is very low, Egypt, as well as many other 
developing countries with high population shares of young people, still end up with a low 
pressure. For the old age pressure, there is, with the exception of Ethiopia and Uganda, a narrow 
clustering of the developing countries around pressure levels below 4%, with widely diverging 
levels of labour market space. The developed countries are all over the place, with Iceland 
combining a very low old age pressure and little space at the labour market against France and 
Italy combining high pressure and much labour market space.  
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Among the developed countries there seems to be at face value a clustering of countries 
belonging to the same welfare regime type as identified by Esping-Andersen (1990). Countries 
belonging to the corporatist, continental, welfare regime, such as Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany and Italy combine high old age pressure of more than 10% with considerable labour 
market space (50% or higher). Members of the social-democratic (the Scandinavian countries 
and the Netherlands) and of the liberal regime (the Anglo-Saxon countries Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, UK and US) have on average both a lower old age pressure (less than 8%) and less 
labour market space.4 
 
As Figure 8 already illustrated, there is considerable variation among countries in their spending 
levels in pensions, health care, education and family support as a percentage of GDP. Iceland, for 
instance, has comparatively very high family costs, which explains why it is located at the right 
of the upper panel of Figure 10, while Italy, France and Greece rank highest on fiscal spending 
for the old, locating them at the right in de middle panel of Figure 10.  
 
Figure 11 shows the dynamic perspective of space versus pressure for the next decade. 
Interestingly, although most countries centre in the middle with modest increases in pressure 
combined with a high variation in space, some countries show a dauntingly high increase in 
pressure of 8%-points of GDP in between 2010 and 2020, while a limited but heterogenous set 
of countries face a decrease in fiscal spending on the dependents during this period. 
 
  
                                                                
4
 See Van der Veen and Groot (2006) for a classification of OECD countries according to their degree of 
(post)productivism and see Goodin and Smitsman (2000) for a convincing case why the Netherlands 
scores social-democratic rather than corporatist. 
Figure 10a  Demographic pressure of the young versus the labour market space 
labour market space in % and pressure in % of GDP 
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Figure 10b  Demographic pressure of the old versus the labour market space 
labour market space in % and pressure in % of GDP 
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Figure 10c  Demographic pressure of the young & the old versus the labour market space 
labour market space in % and pressure in % of GDP 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Note: The demographic pressure for the young is calculated according to equation (2a) and for the old is calculated according to equation (2b). Health care costs are 
not included because the break-down of health costs per age category is not available. The labour market space is according to equation (7)  
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Figure 11  Change demographic pressure of the young & old versus the labour market space 
labour market space in % and pressure in % of GDP 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Note: The change in demographic pressure for the old is calculated according to equation (3). Health care costs are not included because the break-down of health 
costs for the elderly only are not available. The labour market space is according to equation (7) 
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4.4  Ranking of countries according to the indicator pressure-to-space 
The figures 10 and 11 pitch the (change in) pressure versus the labour market space and are 
thus the empirical equivalent of Figure 5. Now we want to summarize the graphical information 
of these figures by ranking the countries by means of the pressure-to-space indicator introduced 
in section 3.4.  
Table 1 reports the results for the pressure-to-space indicator for the years 2010, 2020, 2030, 
2040 and 2050. Table 2 reports the results for the change in the indicator, for 2020 in 
comparison with 2010, for 2030 in comparison with 2020, for 2040 in comparison with 2030 
and 2050 in comparison with 2040. Also, Figure 12 shows the ranking for 2020 and 2050, for 
the changes in the pressure-to-space indicator.  
Let us concentrate on the changes in the indicator. In case the change is high, there should be a 
sense of urgency for policy makers to adapt either government spending or the labour market 
policies to accommodate the upcoming additional fiscal spending. In our opinion the pressure 
coming from changing costs should prompt (or have prompted) adjustments in the labour 
market space. 
Table 2 shows that Poland ranks highest in 2020, but also in 2050, indicating that the pressure 
does not vanish in the course of time by the natural demographic development. Japan, on the 
contrary, ranks third in 2020, but it goes down the ranking in the course of time to place 8 and 9. 
Countries moving rapidly in the opposite direction are Turkey and Greece. Turkey moves 
frighteningly from place 17 in 2020, to 12 in 2030, to 7 in 2040 and even up to 2 in 2050. Greece 
goes less fast upward, but it nonetheless moves from place 13 in 2030 to place 5 and even to the 
top 3 in 2050.  
An interesting feature of Table 1 is that again Poland and Greece rank in the top 3. These 
countries have thus not only face significant changes in fiscal pressure, but are also already quite 
under pressure in comparison with the other economies. 
As expected, most developing countries rank low in this list. The reason is that we assume their 
costs of ageing low in these analyses, although we have to keep in mind that their populations 
are ageing also. We come back to this point in the sensitivity analyses where we make the more 
realistic assumption that the cost of ageing per person will be higher.  
  
A global view on demographic pressure and labour market participation Page 33 
 
Table 1  Rankings of pressure-to-space of the young & the old 
Pressure measured in 2010, 2020, 2030, 2040, 2050 and space in 2008 
  2010   2020   2030   2040   2050   
1 Iceland 41 Luxembourg 56 Luxembourg 64 Luxembourg 70 Luxembourg 71 
2 Uganda 36 Greece 51 Austria 58 Austria 64 Greece 69 
3 Tanzania 29 Iceland 50 Greece 56 Greece 63 Poland 68 
4 Ethiopia 28 Austria 50 Poland 55 Portugal 59 Austria 66 
5 Sweden 25 Poland 49 Portugal 52 Poland 58 Portugal 64 
6 Denmark 23 Japan 48 Switzerland 50 Italy 56 Italy 59 
7 Kenya 23 Finland 47 Finland 50 Japan 54 Japan 57 
8 N Zealand 23 Portugal 47 Iceland 50 Switzerland 53 Czech R 57 
9 Finland 21 Sweden 46 Japan 50 Czech R 51 Switzerland 54 
10 Switzerland 21 Czech R 46 Italy 49 Finland 50 Hungary 51 
11 UK 20 Switzerland 45 Sweden 48 France 49 Finland 51 
12 Hungary 19 Italy 44 Czech R 47 Iceland 49 Iceland 50 
13 Czech R 19 Uganda 44 France 46 Sweden 48 France 50 
14 China 19 Hungary 43 Hungary 44 Hungary 46 Sweden 48 
15 Australia 18 France 41 Denmark 42 Germany 44 Germany 44 
16 Norway 18 Denmark 39 Germany 41 Denmark 43 Spain 42 
17 Austria 17 N Zealand 38 Uganda 41 N Zealand 41 Denmark 42 
18 Russia 17 Ethiopia 36 N Zealand 41 Belgium 41 N Zealand 42 
19 Luxembourg 17 Belgium 36 US 39 US 40 Belgium 41 
20 DR Congo 16 US 35 Belgium 39 Uganda 39 US 41 
21 Korea 16 Tanzania 35 UK 37 UK 38 Turkey 40 
22 Bangladesh 16 UK 35 Tanzania 34 Spain 38 Slovak R 39 
23 Belgium 16 Germany 35 Ethiopia 34 Canada 34 Uganda 39 
24 Poland 15 Spain 30 Canada 34 Slovak R 34 UK 39 
25 Canada 15 Norway 30 Spain 33 Tanzania 33 Canada 35 
26 Portugal 15 Canada 30 Norway 31 Ethiopia 33 Ethiopia 34 
27 US 15 Australia 29 Slovak R 31 Norway 33 Korea 34 
28 Greece 15 Kenya 29 Australia 30 Turkey 32 Tanzania 33 
29 Ireland 15 Slovak R 28 Korea 29 Korea 32 Norway 33 
30 Indonesia 14 Netherlands 26 Netherlands 29 Australia 31 Australia 32 
31 Brazil 14 China 26 Kenya 27 Netherlands 31 Netherlands 30 
32 Philippines 14 Korea 25 Turkey 26 China 29 China 30 
33 Argentina 13 Ireland 24 China 26 Kenya 27 Kenya 29 
34 Mexico 13 Turkey 21 Ireland 24 Ireland 26 Ireland 28 
35 Bulgaria 13 Bangladesh 21 Bangladesh 21 Bangladesh 22 Bangladesh 25 
36 Nigeria 13 Russia 21 Russia 20 Indonesia 21 India 23 
37 Netherlands 13 DR Congo 20 Brazil 20 Brazil 21 Indonesia 23 
38 Romania 12 Brazil 19 DR Congo 19 Russia 20 Brazil 22 
39 Slovak R 12 Indonesia 19 Philippines 19 India 20 Russia 22 
40 Japan 12 Philippines 19 Indonesia 19 Philippines 20 Saudi Arabia 22 
41 France 12 Mexico 17 Mexico 17 DR Congo 19 Philippines 21 
42 Spain 12 Argentina 17 India 17 Mexico 18 Mexico 19 
43 Saudi Arabia 12 Bulgaria 16 Argentina 16 Saudi Arabia 17 DR Congo 19 
44 Italy 12 Saudi Arabia 16 Saudi Arabia 16 Argentina 16 Bulgaria 17 
45 Pakistan 12 Nigeria 16 Bulgaria 15 Bulgaria 16 Romania 17 
46 Germany 12 Romania 15 Nigeria 15 Romania 15 Argentina 16 
47 South Africa 10 India 15 Romania 15 Nigeria 15 Nigeria 15 
48 Egypt 7 Pakistan 15 Pakistan 14 Pakistan 14 Pakistan 15 
49 Turkey 6 South Africa 13 South Africa 13 South Africa 13 South Africa 13 
50 India 6 Egypt 8 Egypt 8 Egypt 8 Egypt 8 
Source: Authors’ calculations – see Figure 10. 
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Table 2 Rankings of the changes in pressure-to-space of the young & the old 
 Pressure measured at 2020, 2030, 2040, 2050 in comparison with 2010. Space measured in 2008. 
  2020-2010   2030-2010   2040-2010   2050-2010   
1 Poland 8.6 Poland 14.6 Poland 17.4 Poland 28.1 
2 Czech R 7.8 Austria 11.0 Austria 16.8 Turkey 21.8 
3 Japan 6.7 Luxembourg 9.9 Luxembourg 16.2 Greece 21.1 
4 Egypt 6.0 Ethiopia 9.6 Italy 15.5 Portugal 19.9 
5 Ethiopia 4.9 France 9.6 Greece 15.3 Austria 18.6 
6 France 4.9 Egypt 8.9 Portugal 14.4 Czech R 18.6 
7 Slovak R 3.9 Czech R 8.9 Turkey 14.1 Italy 17.9 
8 Sweden 3.9 Japan 8.8 Japan 13.5 Luxembourg 17.1 
9 Greece 3.8 Finland 8.2 Czech R 12.5 Japan 16.3 
10 Hungary 3.8 Germany 8.2 Ethiopia 12.2 Slovak R 15.0 
11 Italy 3.4 Italy 8.1 France 12.2 Spain 14.2 
12 US 3.4 Turkey 7.9 Finland 11.2 Ethiopia 12.9 
13 Canada 3.3 Greece 7.9 Germany 11.2 France 12.9 
14 Austria 2.8 Switzerland 7.9 Switzerland 10.8 Hungary 12.0 
15 Belgium 2.8 Portugal 7.6 Spain 9.9 Finland 11.7 
16 Portugal 2.8 US 7.1 Slovak R 9.2 Germany 11.7 
17 Turkey 2.8 Canada 7.0 Egypt 8.7 Switzerland 11.1 
18 Russia 2.8 Slovak R 6.8 US 8.1 India 9.5 
19 Switzerland 2.7 Belgium 6.2 Belgium 7.9 Egypt 9.3 
20 Finland 2.4 Sweden 5.1 Canada 7.7 Korea 9.0 
21 Germany 2.4 Spain 4.7 Korea 7.4 US 8.7 
22 Australia 2.3 Netherlands 4.6 Hungary 7.1 Canada 8.4 
23 UK 2.0 Hungary 4.6 Netherlands 6.8 Belgium 8.3 
24 Spain 2.0 Korea 4.5 India 5.8 Netherlands 6.2 
25 Luxembourg 2.0 New Zealand 4.2 Sweden 5.5 Saudi Arabia 5.9 
26 Netherlands 1.8 UK 3.8 New Zealand 5.1 Ireland 5.8 
27 New Zealand 1.7 Australia 3.7 UK 4.9 Sweden 5.8 
28 Bulgaria 1.6 India 3.2 Denmark 4.8 New Zealand 5.4 
29 Ireland 1.3 Denmark 3.0 Australia 4.4 UK 5.4 
30 India 1.2 Norway 2.4 Norway 3.8 Australia 5.3 
31 Norway 0.9 Russia 2.3 Ireland 3.1 Russia 4.4 
32 Denmark 0.8 Ireland 1.1 China 2.3 Norway 3.6 
33 Iceland 0.6 Bulgaria 1.0 Russia 2.2 China 3.4 
34 Romania 0.5 Saudi Arabia 0.2 Bulgaria 1.4 Denmark 3.2 
35 Korea 0.3 Romania 0.1 Saudi Arabia 1.3 Bulgaria 3.0 
36 Tanzania 0.3 Philippines -0.1 Romania 0.5 Indonesia 2.5 
37 Saudi Arabia 0.3 Iceland -0.1 Indonesia 0.5 Romania 1.9 
38 Kenya 0.0 South Africa -0.1 Philippines 0.4 Philippines 1.3 
39 South Africa -0.1 China -0.6 Mexico -0.4 Brazil 1.1 
40 Nigeria -0.2 Nigeria -0.7 South Africa -0.5 Bangladesh 0.9 
41 Philippines -0.5 Tanzania -0.9 Brazil -0.7 Mexico 0.5 
42 Argentina -0.6 Indonesia -1.0 Iceland -1.2 Iceland 0.3 
43 China -0.8 Kenya -1.1 Nigeria -1.3 Kenya 0.2 
44 Mexico -1.1 Mexico -1.4 Kenya -1.5 South Africa -0.4 
45 Pakistan -1.1 Argentina -1.4 Argentina -1.9 Nigeria -1.3 
46 Indonesia -1.2 Brazil -1.4 Tanzania -1.9 Pakistan -1.4 
47 DR Congo -1.3 Pakistan -1.8 Bangladesh -2.1 Argentina -1.6 
48 Uganda -1.7 DR Congo -2.4 Pakistan -2.2 Tanzania -2.1 
49 Brazil -1.8 Bangladesh -3.4 DR Congo -3.2 DR Congo -3.2 
50 Bangladesh -3.2 Uganda -4.4 Uganda -5.8 Uganda -6.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations – see Figure 11. 
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Figure 12 Ranking according to the pressure-to-space indicator 
Changes in pressure are measured in 2020 and 2050 in deviation from 2010, in percentage points. Space is measured in 
2008, in percentages.  
 
Source: The calculations are according to equation (9). 
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5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
In addition to the analyses in the previous sections, we now perform some simulations that 
show the sensitivity of the outcomes to changes in some of the parameters. It is meant to 
address the gist in the quote “prediction is difficult - especially of the future” ascribed to Mark 
Twain. 
In order to make the presentation here insightful and to avoid running into details for each of 
the countries, we calculate the average of the pressure-to-space indicators as provided in Table 1 
of the group of developing economies or the group of developed economies. This is our baseline 
scenario. In the scenarios that we present here below, we calculate also the average of the 
pressure-to-space indicators for these groups. The comparison is thereafter between the 
simulated and baseline scenario results. 
 
5.1 Increasing the fiscal costs of ageing in the developing economies 
Lack of reliable information on fiscal spending on the retired people in the developing 
economies forced us to make the rather strong assumption to equate the costs for each of these 
economies to the costs that Mexico reports to the OECD, being 1.4% of GDP. Some of the 
countries that we classified as “developing” will face much lower public costs than 1.4% of GDP 
as the old aged, in the absence of public pensions, are taken care of privately in the setting of 
socalled extended families.  
 
Other countries may incur higher costs, especially if future economic growth is used to provide 
income protection for the old aged. In case this happens, also the developing economies may face 
high spending costs. An alternative is to stick to the level of public costs of the old aged as in 
Mexico, but to assume increasing costs over time to reflect improving protection for the old 
aged. In line with the assumption that the cost per old aged relative to GDP per capita is kept 
constant for the countries for which the data are available, we have chosen to set the public 
pension cost equal to that of Turkey, that spent 6.1% of GDP in 2007. In the scenario that we 
analyse here, we assume that all developing economies face similar fiscal costs per capita as 
Turkey, also in the course of time. This scenario amounts to a costs increase of about 400% per 
capita compared to the scenario where we took the relative low costs of Mexico (comparing 1.4 
with 6.1). 
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Figure 13 Simulating higher old age pressure in the developing economies 
in % of GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 14 Simulating higher health costs in developing and developed economies 
in % of GDP 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The lines are simple averages of the indicator pressure-to-space for each of the developing and 
developed countries. 
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Figure 13 shows the average old age pressure of the 21 developing countries in our sample 
called the baseline scenario, along with the simulated higher old age costs scenario. It follows 
that the higher costs per capita lead to an increase of the pressure of almost 4%-points from 
2010 onwards, rising to 12%-points of GDP in 2050, which amounts to a fiscal pressure of 19% 
of GDP in 2050. While in the baseline scenario the ageing costs were compensated in many 
countries by the savings in spending on the young due to the gradual decrease in the population 
share of the young people, the rising costs to provide income support for the old aged dominates 
in the simulated scenario. Some of the developing countries will even enter the top 10 of our 
ranking of the pressure-to-space (see Table 1) in case this scenario becomes truth. From these 
results we therefore draw the conclusion that also the developing countries can easily face high 
costs due to their ageing populations in the course of these period 2010-2050, while their tax 
and administration systems may not always be advanced enough to raise the required tax 
revenues.  
 
5.2 Including the costs of health care 
In the next scenario we take into account the highly sensitive issue of health care costs. This 
makes the outcomes more realistic as most of the consumption of health care is taken in the last 
phase of a person’s life. In developed economies on average 80% of all health care costs that is 
spent over a life time incurs above the age of 65. For this reason, let us indeed assume that a 
share of 0.8 of the health care costs as reported by the OECD for the developed economies is 
included in our measure of the pressure of the old (see equation (2b)). For the developing 
economies we maintain the assumption that their health care costs are similar to the costs as 
reported by Mexico to the OECD for 2007, being 2.6% of GDP, where we also take 80% of these 
costs. 
Figure 14 shows the results. The pressure in the developing economies increases by roughly 3 to 
4% points across the board, in comparison with the baseline scenario. In the developed 
economies, the pressure is already much higher, due to the higher outlays on pensions, family 
costs and education. When we include health care costs for people above the age 65, it follows 
that the pressure rises significantly. In the year 2050, it would lead to an additional 10%-points 
of GDP (from 17% to 27%).  
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6. POLICY REFLECTIONS 
 
The key drivers of the analysis are the labour market space (s), the degree of generosity towards 
the dependent (φ) and the population share of those of working age (wap). As Bloom et al. 
(2010:10) notes, projecting demographic change, although still an inexact science, is easier than 
to predict social-economic variables as productivity growth, because the former is determined 
by only a few key parameters (fertility, life expectancy and migration). Therefore, we take the 
development of wap (and its complements yap and oap, see Appendix C) as uncontroversial and 
exogenous to the policy-maker.5 So far we assumed a constant labour market space and fixed the 
ratio of government expenditures per young and old aged relative to GPD per capita in order to 
identify which countries, mainly due to ageing, will become most pressurized to change labour 
market policies or to adjust their social security systems.  
 
We will now drop these assumptions in order to focus on the main policy choices triggered by 
the changes in the demographic composition of the population. Basically, the policy choice 
involves a trade-off between maintaining social protection and free or heavily subsidized public 
services for the young and old on the one hand and maintaining labour market space for the 
working age population on the other hand. In concrete terms, generous public provisions for the 
old in the form of adequate pensions and free health care and for the young in the form of child 
benefits and free education can only be sustained by inserting a high enough fraction of the 
workforce into paid work who pay the taxes required to finance the public expenditures. 
Analogously, there is more room for relaxed labour market arrangements – ranging from paid 
leaves, early retirement schemes, generous and easily accessible unemployment, sickness and 
disability benefits, waiving the duty to apply for jobs for single parent families with young 
children to all kinds of arrangements facilitating or stimulating working times below the default 
of a full-time work week - the lower the fiscal pressure of the young and old aged.  
 
To illustrate the trade-off between generosity to the young and old and maintaining labour 
market space, the so-called magic quadrant in Figure 15 integrates the three key variables 
labour market space, the level of generosity and the population share of the working age, based 
on a balanced budget equation, equalizing tax revenues from income taxes on the employed to 
the public expenditures on dependents. For the sake of argument, we assume that public  
                                                                
5 For this reason, we abstract from net migration flows and their impact on the population share of the 
working aged. 
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Figure 15 Space, working age population and fiscal costs under a balanced budget
 
Source: Authors. 
 
 
expenditures per old and young person are equal to a fraction φ of GDP per capita, so that the 
balancing budget tax rate is proportional to this generosity paramenter φ (see Appendix C): 
 
                                              
              
          
 
(11) 
 
The curves in Figure 15 are the product of simulations, where the tax rate is set for convenience 
at 0.5. In quadrant I (north-east), labour market space (vertical) is pitched against the working 
age population (horizontal) and the lines represent iso-generosity curves. Suppose the initial 
case is where half the population is of working age, half of them are at work (in fte) and that the 
public support for the young and old aged is 25% of GDP per capita, so wap = 0.5, s = 0.5 and φ = 
0.25. If because of ageing, the population share of the working age goes down, then the 
generosity towards those of non-working age can only be sustained by moving along the iso-
generosity line to the left, so reducing labour market space. In quadrant II (south-east), with wap 
on the horizontal and φ on the vertical axis, the curves depict all combinations of φ and wap 
compatible with the same level of space. 
wap  
s
φ
s
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Drawing a horizontal line at some arbitrary generosity level φ shows that more labour market 
space is only possible at higher shares of the working age population, e.g. to keep φ at 25% 
allows only a space of 0.25 if wap is 0,4, but it can be increased to 0.5 if wap is 0.5. Moving along 
the curves in quadrant II shows that at constant levels of space, generosity must fall if the share 
of the workforce declines. Finally, quadrant III (south-west) shows all possible combinations of 
space and generosity levels compatible with the same workforce. In general, given the share of 
the workforce, a higher level of generosity requires a reduction in space. The two iso-wap curves 
nicely illustrate that for the same level of generosity, say φ= 0.25, there is more room for relaxed 
labour market arrangements, the higher the population share of the workforce. 
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7. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Due to population dynamics, the population shares of young and old are continuously changing, 
which gives rise to changes in the population share of the working aged. This paper seeks to 
provide operational measures for comparing countries in terms of demographic pressure and 
labour market space. Usually the challenge of ageing is expressed in terms of a rising old age 
dependency ratio, or a combination of the old and young age dependency ratios, but this delivers 
an incomplete picture of the actual challenges.  
We argue that the share of the working age that actually performs paid work, measured in full-
time equivalents, is a country-specific system variable that is determined by a complex set of 
factors such as flexibility of labour markets, cultural norms with respect to female labour 
participation and working hours’ legislation. Inclusion of this country-specific labour market 
space allows us to calculate the inactive-active ratio and a pressure-to-space indicator for 50 
countries, among which 21 developing countries, over the period 1950-2050. We included all 
G20-countries, all other OECD- and EFTA-countries, Bulgaria and Romania, and all countries 
belonging to the top-10 in world population in 2050, being Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Tanzania and Uganda. Together, these 50 
countries cover three quarters of the world population.  
The inactive-active ratios show the development of the number of inactive persons, that is all 
younger than 15 or older than 65 plus all those of working age not doing paid work, relative to 
the active persons. For the decades to come, this ratio will increase for all developed economies. 
The pressure-to-space indicator also includes information about the public expenditures on 
education and family support per young and public pensions per old relative to GDP per capita. 
Doing so identifies which countries will feel the pressure most, where pressure is higher, the 
higher the government outlays for education, family support and pensions relative to GDP per 
capita and the lower the labour market space. 
We draw two main conclusions from our empirical analyses.  
First, according to the indicator pressure-to-space the demographic pressure to labour market 
space is mounting most for Poland, Greece and Turkey. In case they keep their current fiscal 
expenditure rates on the young and old constant, their fiscal spending as a percentage of GDP 
will be 8%-points higher in 2020 than in 2010. The situation is especially precarious for Greece, 
as it already has a high pressure-to-space indicator (and we did not take into account its 
accumulated public debt). In between 2010 and 2050, the population share of the working aged 
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will fall from 0.67 to 0.55, while the currently available labour market space is comparatively 
rather low (0.36 in 2008), mainly due to the high average number of hours worked per worker, 
according to the OECD statistics. Based on this analysis, one may doubt whether Greece will be 
able to sustain its public expenditures to the young and old in the future relative to GDP per 
capita, unless it is able to raise the labour force participation rate. 
Second, not only developed economies face a demographic challenge. Despite their higher 
population growth, developing economies may run into the situation of excessive fiscal 
spending. A clear example, as already mentioned, is Turkey that ranks second in the increases in 
fiscal spending in 2050, between Poland and Greece. Its additional fiscal spending will be 8%-
points in 2030, 14% in 2040 and 20% in 2050 in comparison with 2010.  
Alarmingly, other developing countries may also enter the top 10 of our ranking of pressure-to-
space. The reason is that we kept the spending costs for the developing countries in our analyses 
relatively low, at the level of Mexico (1.4% of GDP in 2007). Sensitivity analyses show that 
assuming higher costs for the developing countries will lead on average to an increase of more 
than 10%-points in the pressure-to-space indicator in 2050 in comparison with our baseline 
scenario (with the spending costs of Mexico). This would bring some of the developing countries 
in the top 10 of our ranking of the pressure-to-space. 
A host of other factors not taken into account in this study are relevant to assess whether a 
country is able to accommodate its demographic pressure. A highly relevant avenue for further 
research is the fiscal sustainability of countries, by taking into account financial variables such as 
the public debt stocks, the accumulated capital account balance and the share of capital funding 
in pensions benefits. Likewise, net migration flows matter. The indicators developed in this 
paper can be used to predict future migration flows from countries with a low GDP per capita, 
high young age dependency ratios and high labour market space towards countries with high 
GDP per capita, low high young age dependency ratios and low labour market space. 
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Appendix A Data definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition, unity Data source, year 
AGEret,off Official retirement age, in years OECD Society at a 
glance 2011 
E Employment number of people, in million of 
persons 
OECD, 2009 
er Employment to working age population, ratio – for 
the developing economies 
UN Millennium 
Indicators  Database 
GDP Gross domestic product in purchasing power parity IMF, World Economic 
Outlook April 2011 
H Average number of actual working, hours per year OECD 
 Number of persons  per 5-year cohort, in million of 
persons 
UN 
 Public pension costs (old age and survivors), as 
percentage of GDP 
OECD Society at a 
glance 2011 
 Public spending on family, as percentage of GDP OECD Society at a 
glance 2011 
 Public spending on education OECD 
 Country information on public spending WB, IMF 
   
Note: 
IMF = International Monetary Fund 
OECD = Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
UN = United Nations 
WB = World Bank 
Detailed references to statistics’ publications appear in the reference list. 
Our databases are available upon request. 
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Appendix B Population structure per country  
This appendix illustrates the population structure per 5-year cohorts for each of the countries in 
our empirical analyses for the years 2010 and 2050. We divide the countries into developing 
(Figure B1) and developed (Figure B2). The economies in the first group have a GDP per capita 
lower than 16,000 international US dollar (purchasing power parity) in 2010, which is around 
12,000 euro.  
As follows from these figures, most developing economies have a pyramid structure in 2010 
while the developed economies have a kite form with their broadest width around the age of 40 
to 65 years.6 Exceptions among the developing countries are Bulgaria and Romania and to a 
lesser extent China and Russia. Their demographic structure is not a pyramid, as the width of the 
younger cohorts is smaller than the width of the cohorts of the working age population. The 
African countries Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Tanzania also have 
a pyramid structure that widens significantly from 2010 to 2050, even at the youngest cohort of 
0 to 5 years.  
The figures further show that all these populations are ageing, as the cohorts of the old are wider 
in 2050 than in 2010. Note that due to rising life expectancy, the last cohort in 2050 (those 
above the age of 100+) shown in the graphs is no longer empty for almost all countries that we 
have under investigation here.  
 
  
                                                                
6 One of the main economic consequences of a pyramid structure is the excess labour supply, see Bruni 
(2011) that analyses the case of China or Peeters (2011) that analyses the case of Egypt. 
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Figure B1 Population structure of the developing economies in 2010 and 2050 
5-year cohorts, 2010 in green bars, 2050 in blue lines, women left and men right 
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Source: Authors - based on projections by the United Nations Population Information Network, 2011.  
 
 
 
Figure B2 Population structure of the developed economies in 2010 and 2050 
5-year cohorts, 2010 in green bars, 2050 in blue lines, women left and men right 
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Source: Authors - based on projections by the United Nations Population Information Network, 2011.  
 
 
 
These 21 developing economies and 29 developed economies cover 5.4 of the 6.9 billion people 
worldwide in 2010, which is 79% of the world population. We cover more than 50% of the 
population of Africa, Asia, Europe, Oceania and North and Latin America, as follows from Figure 
B3. Population growth during the period 2010-2050 is expected to grow fastest in Africa, in both 
absolute and relative terms and its world population share increases from 15% to 23%. In this 
period, the population share of Asia is expected to shrink 5%-points, from 60 to 55%. Europe 
shrinks 3%-points, from 11 to 8% (see Figure B3).  
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Figure B3 World population in 2010 and 2050 and country coverage in this study 
 
  
Source: Authors - based on projections by the United Nations Population Information Network, 2011.  
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Appendix C The ia-ratio and pressure-to-space indicator 
As follows from Figure 2, the total population of country i at time t equals the young, the 
working age and the old-age population, 
                            
(A1) 
Dividing both sides by the total population gives 
                       
(A2) 
which gives us, for a random country, the distribution of the young, old and working age 
normalized at one. We therefore normalise the area of the pyramid in Figure 2 to unity, which is 
convenient for the comparison of the population structures of countries irrespective of their 
population size. 
We define the fraction of the working age population not engaged into paid work measured in 
full-time equivalents (fte) as the labour market space s. The population share of the active 
working age in fte can then be expressed as 
               
and therefore the fraction of the total population that is inactive as 
                 
for which reason the ratio of inactive to active (ia) ratio is equal to  
      
 
              
   
(1) 
The indicator pressure-to-space was defined as 
        
                 
    
 
which, using (5), can be expressed as 
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Space is country-specific but we assume it to remain constant over time. Moreover, we also fixed 
the country-specific per capita public expenditures relative to GDP per capita over time, so the 
equation above boils down to 
                  
   
  
 
(10) 
by using (A2) and assuming an equal per capita cost for young and old relative to GDP per capita 
that we denote as   . Besides pressure exerted by the young and old age, one might also be 
interested in the total pressure exerted by all the inactive persons, so including the non-working 
part of the working age population. The total pressure by the inactive persons per full-time 
active persons then follows as: 
 
          
                                        
              
 
                    
              
          
 
This indicator gives the fiscal pressure of all the inactive persons (in the numerator) relative to 
all active persons (denominator) and turns out to be proportional to the ia-ratio provided the 
generosity to the inactive can be summarized into a country-specific weighted variable (  ).  
In section 6, it was implicitly assumed that the non-working share of the workforce are not 
entitled to social benefits, since in the balance budget equation the tax revenues are used to 
finance public support to only the young and old:  
                                              
              
          
         
(11) 
This equation is the basis for the policy trade-off analysed in section 6 and illustrated in Figure 
15. Therefore, given the optimal tax rate (or the politically feasible tax rate), the generosity that 
can be maintained to the young and old is inversely proportional to the ia-ratio. However, 
assuming that all persons belonging to the labour market space are entitled to public support 
does not fundamentally change the analysis. The balanced budget equation changes into 
                                                          
              
                  
 
(11’) 
which gives a slightly different curvatures of the lines in Figure 15. However, it does not change 
the conclusion that there is a trade-off between maintaining public support to the non-working 
and maintaining labour market space. 
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Appendix D Inactive-active ratio and pressure young and old  
 
This appendix presents the inactive to active ratios per country for all economies (Figure D1) 
and the pressure of the young and the old (Figure D2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure D1 Inactive-active ratios per country 
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Source: Authors - based on projections by the United Nations Population Information Network, 2011.  
Note: The ia-ratio is the number of persons below the age of 15 and above 65 in addition to those in the 
space as a percentage of the total employed persons. 
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Figure D2 Pressure of the young and the old per country 
% of GDP, indexed at 2010=100 
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Source: Authors - based on projections by the United Nations Population Information Network, 2011.  
Note: Pressure is measured as the sum of equations (2a) and (2b). 
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